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Recent Developments in

Pennsylvania Employment Law
James F Glunt* and Jill L. Locnika'**
EMPLOYMENT

LAw

-

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

NEGLIGENT

OF TORTS

SUPERVISION

§ 317

-

AND

RETENTION

-

EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO

PREVENT AN EMPLOYEE FROM INTENTIONALLY HARMING OTHERS WHEN
THE EMPLOYEE IS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a Bishop and a Diocese
were liable under the theory of negligent supervision and retention
for a priest's sexual abuse of a minor in a motel room because they
both knew the priest had a propensity for pedophilic behavior, they
concealed this fact and allowed the priest to have unsupervised
contact with children, and the priest was able to enter the motel
room only because of his status as a priest, the servant of the
Bishop and the Diocese.
Hutchison v. Luddy, 742 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1999) (plurality opinion).
In 1982, when Michael Hutchison was fifteen years old and
staying in an Altoona motel room, his priest and godfather, Francis
Luddy, entered the motel room and sexually molested Michael.' A
similar incident occurred two years later; in both cases, Michael
had run away from his family in Akron, Ohio and hitchhiked to
Altoona to talk to Luddy about family problems.2 These two
incidents followed a pattern of Luddy's sexual molestation of
Michael stemming back to 1977, when Michael was ten to eleven
years old.3 Over these four years, "Luddy molested Michael
* Editor-in-Chief, Volume 38, Duquesne Law Review; J.D. 2000, Duquesne University
School of Law; B.S. 1993, Pennsylvania State University.
** Associate Recent Decisions Editor, Volume 38, Duquesne Law Review; J.D. 2000,
Duquesne University School of Law; B.A. 1989, Loyola University Chicago.
1. See Hutchison v. Luddy, 742 A-2d 1052, 1054 (Pa. 1999) (plurality opinion). This
incident has also been reported as occurring "in early 1983." See Hutchison v. Luddy, 683
A.2d 1254, 1255 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), overruled by Hutchison v. Luddy, 742 A.2d 1052
(Pa. 1999).
2. See Hutchison, 742 A.2d at 1054; Hutchison, 683 A.2d at 1258 (Ford Elliot, J.,
dissenting). Michael later testified that on both occasions "it was Luddy who told Michael to
rent a room at the Townhouse Motel and that [Luddy] would meet Michael there as soon as
he could." See Hutchison, 742 A.2d at 1054 n.1.
3. See Hutchison, 742 A-2d at 1053. Luddy's abuse of Michael is especially repugnant
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approximately fifty to seventy-five times in Luddy's rectory
bedroom" at St. Therese's Catholic Church in Altoona 4 Luddy later
admitted that beginning in 1967, about two years after he was
ordained as a priest, he molested "child after child" within his
diocese, the Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown ("Diocese"), including
molesting Michael's brother, Mark, "hundreds of times."5 At the
time of the 1982 and 1984 motel room incidents, "Luddy was
working at St. Mary's [Catholic] Church in Windber, Pennsylvania,
6
where he had been reassigned."
In 1988, Michael sued Luddy, St. Therese's, the Diocese, and
Bishop James Hogan, who "served as the Bishop of the Diocese at
the time of the incidents in question," for damages caused by the
two incidents in the Altoona motel rooms.7 Michael's complaint
"alleg[ed] causes of action for, inter alia, battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and negligent retention and
supervision."8 The trial court allowed Michael to pursue his
negligent retention and supervision claim under Section 317 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which imposes liability upon a
master for certain acts of the servant committed outside the scope
of employment.9 During an eleven-week trial, "Michael testified
about the 1982 and 1984 incidents," other boys testified about
similar patterns of abuse, Luddy admitted to much of the abuse,
and Michael "presented evidence that the Diocese had actual notice
of Luddy's pedophilia" as early as 1967, yet did nothing to prevent
future such incidents. 10
After the trial, the jury found as follows:
St. Therese's, Bishop Hogan and the Diocese knew Luddy was
molesting children, . . . they were negligent in their retention
when considered in light of the fact that Michael "is mildly retarded and has a low I.Q." See
id.

4. See id.
5. See id. at 1054. Apparently, Luddy's pattern of behavior was one of "befriending...
boys, luring them and their families into a sense of trust, and then molesting the boys."
Hutchison, 683 A.2d at 1258 (Ford Elliot, J., dissenting).
6. Hutchison, 742 A-2d at 1054.
7. See Hutchison, 742 A.2d at 1054; Hutchison, 683 A.2d at 1255. Only these last two
incidents escaped the bar of the applicable statutory limitations period. See Hutchison, 742
A.2d at 1054; Hutchison, 683 A.2d at 1255 n.3. St. Mary's, where Luddy worked at the time of
the two Altoona motel incidents, "was not a party-defendant in this action." Hutchison, 683
A.2d at 1255 n.4.
8. Hutchison, 742 A.2d at 1054.
9. See Hutchison, 683 A.2d at 1255-56; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToiRS § 317 (1974).
10. See id. The Diocese disputed the evidence of actual notice of Luddy's pedophilia.
See Hutchison, 683 A.2d at 1259-60 (Ford Elliott, J., dissenting).
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and supervision of Luddy, ... they had a pattern and practice
of ignoring allegations of pedophilic behavior among priests,
and .. . their negligence was a substantial factor in bringing
harm to Michael. The jury attributed liability thirty-six percent
to Luddy, eleven percent to St. Therese's, and fifty-three
percent to Bishop Hogan and the Diocese and awarded
Michael a total of $519,000.00 in compensatory damages. The
jury also found that the conduct of all the defendants was
outrageous, and therefore awarded Michael punitive damages
totaling $1,050,000.00 (fifty thousand dollars against Luddy and
one million dollars against St. Therese's, Bishop Hogan and the
Diocese)."
St. Therese's, Bishop Hogan, and the Diocese appealed to the
Pennsylvania Superior Court, which reversed the trial court and
discharged all three from liability.12 In an opinion by Judge John G.
Brosky, the superior court analyzed the trial court's decision to
allow Michael's claim under Section 317 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, but the superior court did not review
Pennsylvania case law interpreting that section. 13 The court held
that St. Therese's, Bishop Hogan, and the Diocese could not be
liable for negligent supervision and retention under Section 317
because the facts of the case failed to meet the threshold
requirement of Section 317: the act that caused harm must have
occurred "upon [a] premises . . . upon which the servant is
privileged to enter only as [the master's] servant." 14 Judge Kate
Ford Elliot wrote a dissenting opinion, summarizing the "relevant
testimony before the jury," "viewing [that] evidence in the light
most favorable to [Michael] as the verdict winner," and concluding
that there was sufficient reliable evidence to support the jury
11. Hutchison, 742 A-2d at 1054.
12. Hutchison, 683 A.2d at 1255. Luddy was not a party to this appeal; he filed a
separate appeal to the superior court, which was consolidated but later severed from the
appeal of St. Therese's, Bishop Hogan, and the Diocese. See id. at 1254 n.2.
13. Id. at 1254-56; see also Hutchison, 742 A.2d at 1060 (noting that the superior court
did not consider prior Pennsylvania case law interpreting Section 317 and instead "analyzed
Michael's claim for negligent supervision and retention exclusively pursuant to Restatement
Section 317"). In her dissenting opinion, Judge Ford Elliott analyzed the one Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision interpreting Section 317. Hutchison, 683 A-2d at 1258-59 (Ford
Elliott, J., dissenting) (citing and analyzing Dempsey v. Walso Bureau, Inc., 246 k2d 418 (Pa_
1968)).
14. Id. at 1254-56; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317(a)(i) (1974). Of the
three-judge panel of the Superior Court, Judge Patrick R. Tamilia concurred only in the
result of Judge Brosky's opinion, and Judge Kate Ford Elliott dissented. Hutchison, 683 A.2d
at 1256 (Tamilia, J., concurring) and at 1256 (Ford Elliott, J., dissenting).
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verdict for compensatory damages."5
Michael then appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which
affirmed the superior court's decision to release St. Therese's from
liability, but reversed the superior court's decision to release
Bishop Hogan and the Diocese from liability."
In the plurality opinion by Justice Sandra Schultz Newman, the
court began its analysis of the superior court's opinion by quoting
Section 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. That section,
titled "Duty of Master to Control Conduct of Servant," states as
follows:
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to
control his servant while acting outside the scope of his
employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming
others or from so conducting himself as to create an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if
(a) the servant
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master
or upon which the servant is privileged to enter only
as his servant, or
(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and
(b) the master
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the
ability to control his servant, and
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and
15. Hutchison, 683 A.2d at 1257-60 (Ford Elliott, J., dissenting). However, Judge Ford.
Elliott would have vacated the award of punitive damages, writing that
while there was ample evidence presented in the instant case that the conduct of the
Diocese was inept, exhibited a complete lack of understanding of the disease of
pedophilia, and constituted gross negligence, I cannot find that the evidence was
sufficient as a matter of law to show that the conduct of the Diocese rose to the level
of being malicious, wanton, or based on any evil motive.
Id. at 1261 (Ford Elliott, J., dissenting).
16. Hutchison, 742 A.2d at 1062. At the supreme court, attorney Thomas L. Cooper
from Pittsburgh and attorney Richard M. Serbin from the Altoona law firm of Reese, Serbin,
Kovacs & Nypaver represented Michael; attorneys Carl A. Eck and Louis C. Long from the
Pittsburgh law firm of Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck represented St. Therese's,
Bishop Hogan, and the Diocese. See id. at 1053.
The supreme court was somewhat splintered for this difficult case. Justice Sandra Schultz
Newman wrote the plurality opinion announcing the judgment of the court, which was joined
by Chief Justice John P. Flaherty, Jr. Id. at 1053-62. Justice Ralph J. Cappy filed a separate
concurring opinion, id. at 1062-64 (Cappy, J., concurring), as did Justice Thomas G. Saylor,
who was joined by Justice Stephen A. Zappala, id. at 1064 (Saylor, J., concurring). Justice
Russell M. Nigro concurred in the plurality's result only. Id. at 1062. Finally, Justice Ronald
D. Castille filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1064-68 (Castille, J., dissenting).
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opportunity for exercising such control. 17
Justice Newman then whittled Michael's lengthy complaint into
general terms and summarized it as a "cause of action against St.
Therese's, Bishop Hogan and the Diocese for negligent retention
and supervision of Luddy."'5 Unlike the superior court, however, the
supreme court distinguished between the three parties "because of
the timing of the incidents of abuse on which th[e] action is
based."1 9 The court found that "the only harm for which St.
Therese's [was] responsible [was] the abuse that took place while
Luddy was assigned to St. Therese's and Michael was a parishioner
there, and liability for all such incidents of abuse is barred by the
statute of limitations." 0 Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the
superior court's decision "insofar as it absolve[d] St. Therese's of
liability."21

17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrs § 317 (1974) (emphasis added). The emphasized
phrase, referred to by the supreme court as the "privilege element of the location
requirement," becomes the critical language in the case. See Hutchison, 742 A.2d at 1060.
18. Hutchison, 742 A.2d at 1056.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. Apparently the supreme court is unwilling to extend liability under Section 317
to responsibility for the acts of former employees, as the high courts of other jurisdictions
have done. See Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 280-81 (N.H. .1995) (noting that "employers
have been held liable for criminal conduct by off-duty employees or former employees where
such conduct was consistent with a propensity of which the employer knew or should have
known, and the association between the plaintiff and the employee was occasioned by the
employee's job") (citations omitted). In a 1980 case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
reversed a trial court's decision to sustain a defendant's preliminary objection in the nature
of a demurrer in a negligent supervision and retention case involving a former employee; the
former employee raped a woman who was a customer of the employer, having gained entry
to her home by pretending to be there on his former employer's business. See Coath v.
Jones, 419 A.2d 1249 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
The Hutchison court expressly recognized that St. Therese's contributed to the causation
of Luddy's abuse of Michael at the motel rooms, stating, "The jury found, and we have no
doubt, that St. Therese's failure to warn was a substantial factor in bringing harm to
Michael." Hutchison, 742 A.2d at 1057 (emphasis added). Justice Newman's opinion does not
make clear whether the court is releasing St. Therese's from liability because it did not have
a duty to warn other parishes about Luddy's pedophilic conduct, of which the jury found St.
Therese's had knowledge, or whether St. Therese's did have a duty to warn, but did not
breach that duty. In a footnote in his concurring opinion, Justice Cappy elaborates somewhat
on this issue: "Moreover, decisions regarding placement, discipline, and transfer of priests
were not made at the parish level. Under these circumstances I do not believe that St.
Therese's Church can be held liable." Hutchison, 742 A.2d at 1063 n.1 (Cappy, J.,
concurring). However, it is arguable that despite not having the authority to make decisions
regarding transfer, St. Therese's, who could be regarded as Luddy's former employer, still
had a duty to warn the parish that Luddy was transferred to about his known pedophilic
behavior, and that the breach of that duty occurred within the statutory limitations period
for the two incidents on which this lawsuit was based. It is unfortunate that the
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In reviewing Michael's negligent supervision and retention claims
against Bishop Hogan and the Diocese, the supreme court found
that the superior court erred by failing to review those claims
under Pennsylvania (and other jurisdictions') case law, and by
misinterpreting the "privilege element of the location requirement
of Restatement Section 317."22 The court then reviewed cases from
Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions dealing with whether
employers should be held liable for the intentional acts of
employees that are outside the scope of employment, but that
involve a dangerous propensity of the employee of which the
employer was aware.2 3 Based on these cases and evidence
introduced at trial, the court concluded that Bishop Hogan and the
Diocese were liable for Luddy's molestation of Michael:
Bishop Hogan and the Diocese . . . undertook a course of
conduct that increased the risk that Luddy would abuse
Michael and other children. Instead of keeping him away from
children altogether, they disregarded Luddy's misconduct and
allowed him to have unsupervised contact with children.
Instead of responding to Luddy's pedophilic behavior, they
concealed and ignored it. . . . Their inaction in the face of
such a menace is not only negligent, it is reckless and
24
abhorrent.
Regarding the privilege aspect of Section 317, the court corrected
the superior court's slim analysis of this requirement. The superior
court held that this element was not-satisfied because "although
Luddy may have been privileged to enter [the motel rooms] for the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was not able to clarify this important issue when releasing St.
Therese's from liability.
22. Hutchison, 742 A.2d at 1057-60.
23. Id. at 1057-59 (citing and discussing Dempsey v. Walso Bureau, Inc., 246 A.2d 418
(Pa. 1968) (holding that the employer of a security guard could be liable for an assault by
the guard that occurred at the premises to be guarded if the employer knew or should have
known about the security guard's propensity for violence); Coath v. Jones, 419 A.2d 1249 (Pa.
Super. 1980) (holding that the owner of a utility company could be liable for a former
employee's rape of a customer that occurred at the customer's home, entry made because
the former employee had previously been allowed to enter on employer's business, if the
employer knew or should have known about the former employee's propensity for sexual
attacks); Golden Spread Council, Inc. v. Akins, 926 S.W.2d (Tex. 1996) (holding that a Council
of the Boy Scouts could be liable for an act of sexual molestation committed by a
scoutmaster if the Council knew or should have known that the scoutmaster had a
propensity for molesting boys); Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272 (N.H. 1995) (holding that a
school district could be liable for an off-duty teacher's abuse of children if the school district
knew or should have known about the teacher's propensity for such abuse)).
24. Id. at 1059.
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purpose of providing pastoral care . . . , he certainly was not
privileged to enter the motel room[s] as a servant of [Bishop Hogan
and the Diocese] for the purpose of engaging in sexual
misconduct."2 5 Justice Newman wrote that the proper focus of the
privilege element, which applies to a case where the alleged
tortious act occurs off the employer's premises, is not what the
servant intended to do after entering the premises, but rather how
the servant gained access to the premises in the first place.2 6 If the
servant gained access to the premises because he was privileged to
be there due to his status as the master's servant, then the privilege
element of Section 317 is met.27 The court concluded that there was
sufficient evidence on record for a jury to properly conclude that
Luddy gained acces to the motel rooms because of his status as a
priest, the servant of the Bishop and the Diocese. 28 The court
ended its analysis of the case by noting that because the Bishop
and the Diocese had knowledge of Luddy's pedophilia and had
actual ability to control Luddy's behavior, "by forcing him into
treatment or by terminating his employment," all requirements of
29
Section 317 were met.
Justice Ralph J. Cappy filed a separate concurring opinion in
which he stated his agreement with Justice Newman's opinion that
St. Therese's should be released from liability, but that the
judgment against Bishop Hogan and the Diocese should be
affirmed. 30 Justice Cappy wrote separately to focus on the privilege
element of Section 317, noting resolution as to whether this
element was satisfied is difficult because the record reveals
"numerous, and arguably inconsistent, reasons for Father Luddy's
presence" in the two motel rooms.31 Michael's own testimony
supported at least six reasons for Michael to twice invite Luddy to
his motel room, other than the fact that Luddy was Michael's priest:
[because] (1) [Michael] missed Father Luddy; (2) Father Luddy
25. Hutchison, 683 A.2d at 1256 n.6.
26. Hutchison, 742 A.2d at 1060.
27. Id.
28. Id. The court quoted extensively from Michael's testimony at trial in support of this
finding, demonstrating that Michael invited Luddy to the motel rooms solely because Michael
sought his counsel as his priest, and not because Michael wanted money or sexual activity.
Id. at 1060-62.
29. Id. at 1062; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 317(b)(i) and (ii) (1974) (requiring
that the master know of the ability to control the servant and know of the reason for
exercising such control).
30. Id. at 1062, 1063 n.1 (Cappy, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 1063 (Cappy, J., concurring).

858

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 38:851

could help him with his depression; (3) Father Luddy was a
good listener; (4) Father Luddy was a kind, nice person; (5)
[Michael] had love in his heart for Father Luddy; and [6]
[Michael] believed that Father Luddy might assist him
32
fmancially.
Despite these-many possible reasons for Luddy's presence in the
motel rooms, Justice Cappy wrote that the privilege element of
Section 317 was satisfied here for two reasons: first, because the
jury is always free to accept some parts of a witness's testimony
and reject others, and second, because in Justice Cappy's view, the
role of a priest includes counseling on a wide variety of personal
matters, and is not limited to the exercise of religious duties.M
Finally, Justice Cappy did not join in Justice Newman's criticism of
the superior court for failing to analyze the case outside of the
Restatement (Second), because "the jury was instructed on liability
solely pursuant to section 317."Justice Thomas G. Saylor wrote an opinion concurring in the
result reached by Justice Newman, without analysis or rationale,
and was joined by Justice Stephen A. Zappala. 35 Justice Saylor
wrote separately simply to clarify that he did not join in the
"characterization of the defendant's conduct as reckless and
abhorrent" because the just overturned superior court had yet to
analyze whether the award of punitive damages should be upheld. 36
Justice Ronald D. Castille dissented, writing that although "the
facts engender a great deal of outrage against the tortfeasor and
sympathy for the victim, . . . the governing law is fixed and clear,
and precludes liability for [all defendants]." 37 Focusing on the
privilege element of Section 317, Justice Castille noted that because
"the servant in this case, Luddy, was not upon premises in
possession of the master at the time of the alleged negligent acts,
the essence of the inquiry becomes whether Luddy was upon
premises which he was privileged to enter only as his master's
servant." 38 For Justice Castille, the one word from the Section 317
32. Hutchison, 742 A-2d at 1063 n.2 (Cappy, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 1063-64 (Cappy, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 1064 (Cappy, J., concurring).
35. Id. (Saylor, J., concurring).
36. Id. (Saylor, J., concurring). See id. at 1059, where Justice Newman states that the
defendants' "inaction in the face of such a menace is not only negligent, it is reckless and
abhorrent."
37. Hutchison, 742 A.2d at 1064-65 (Castille, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 1065 (Castille, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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privilege clause that was not met here is the word "only;" because
the record showed that Michael invited Luddy to the motel rooms
for a variety of reasons, Justice Castille could not find "an
exclusive causal nexus between Luddy's priestly status and his
entry to the hotel room[s]." 39 Therefore, Justice Castille did not
believe that Bishop Hogan and the Diocese had a duty with respect
40
to the two incidents at issue.
Hutchison was a very difficult case that unfortunately did not
result in the clarification of Pennsylvania employment law in the
important area of an employer's liability for an employee's acts that
are outside the scope of employment. Perhaps a future case will
further clarify the meaning of the Section 317 requirement that the
conduct occur on premises "upon which the servant is privileged to
enter only as his [master's] servant."
WORKERS' COMPENSATION OFF DuTY INJURIES
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a workers'
compensation claimant who sustained an injury while she was off
duty but present at the workplace while obtaining her paycheck
was entitled to workers' compensation benefits, despite the fact
that the claimant had other options for obtaining her paycheck.
EMPLOYMENT LAW -

Hoffman v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Westmoreland
Hospital), 741 A.2d 1286 (Pa. 1999).
Nannie Hoffman, a secretary employed by Westmoreland Health
System, fell down and hurt herself when she stopped by her
workplace one Friday for the sole purpose of picking up her
paycheck. 41 Hoffman was not scheduled to work that day, and her
employer offered two other options for collecting paychecks that
42
did not require the employee to visit the office on payday.
However, personal retrieval of paychecks at the workplace was an
authorized method for Westmoreland Health System employees to
39. Id. at 1065-68 (Castille, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 1065-68 (Castille, J., dissenting). In a final footnote, Justice Castille clarified
that the Hutchison opinion should not be interpreted as resolving an issue that the courts of
other jurisdictions have recently grappled with: whether "a cause of action against a religious
sect for negligent retention of its religious leaders... [constitutes] excessive entanglements
with religious beliefs contrary to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution." Id.
at 1068 n.7 (Castille, J., dissenting).
41. See Hoffman v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Bd. (Westmoreland Hospital), 741
A.2d 1286, 1286-87 (Pa. 1999).
42. See Hoffman, 741 A.2d at 1286-87. The two options that did not require the
employee to visit the workplace were "direct deposit to a financial institution" and "delivery
by regular mail." See id. at 1286.
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be paid.43
In response to Hoffman's subsequent petition for workers'
compensation benefits, her employer "conceded the [she] had been
injured but denied that [she] was acting within the course of her
employment at the time she suffered the injury" as required by
Pennsylvania's Workers' Compensation Act.14 The workers'
compensation judge agreed, "finding that [Hoffman's] injury did not
arise in the course of her employment." 45 Hoffman appealed first to
the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Appeal Board and
subsequently to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, both of
which affirmed the workers compensation judge's decision to deny
46
benefits.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Hoffman's petition for
appeal in order to determine whether an employee is within the
scope of employment for workers' compensation purposes when
that employee's "presence was not required [at the workplace] for
the payment of wages, but rather, [the employee] had available
alternative options for obtaining payment."47 Justice Thomas G.
Saylor wrote the opinion for the unanimous court, reversing the
commonwealth court and remanding the case "for calculation of
benefits."48
43. See id. at 1286.
44. See id. at 1287. Pennsylvania's Workers' Compensation Act states in relevant part as
follows:
Every employer shall be liable for compensation for personal injury to, or for the
death of each employe[e], by an injury in the course of his employment, and such
compensation shall be paid in all cases by the employer, without regard to negligence,
according to the [statutory] schedules.
PA_ STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431 (West Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
45. See Hoffman, 741 A.2d at 1287.
46. See Hoffman v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Bd. (Westmoreland Hospital), 711
A.2d 567, 568 (Pa. Commnw. Ct. 1998), overruled by Hoffman v. Workers' Compensation
Appeal Bd. (Westmoreland Hospital), 741 A.2d 1286 (Pa. 1999). Senior Judge Jess Juliante
wrote the commonwealth court's opinion and was joined by Judge Dante R. Pelligrini,.
Hoffman, 711 A.2d at 568. Judge Rochelle S. Friedman dissented, writing that
[blecause being paid is a major benchmark of the employer-employee relationship,
because [Hoffman] received her paycheck in accordance with an acceptable method
established by [Westmoreland Health System] and because we are required to liberally
construe the [Workers' Compensation] Act to the benefit of injured workers, I would
conclude that [Hoffman] satisfied her burden of proving that she was injured while in
the course of her employment.
Hoffman, 711 A.2d at 571 (Friedman, J., dissenting).
47. Hoffman, 741 A-2d at 1288. At the supreme court, attorney Robert H. Slone from
the Greensburg law firm of Mahady & Mahady represented Hoffman, and attorney Harry W.
Rosensteel from the Pittsburgh law firm of Thomson, Rhodes & Cowie represented
Westmoreland Hospital. See id. at 1286.
48. Id. at 1288.
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The Hoffman court began its analysis by noting that determining
"[w]hether a claimant's injury arose 'within the course of
employment' under the [Workers' Compensation] Act . . . is a
question of law to be determined based on the findings of fact."19
The court then noted that the Workers' Compensation Act defines
the phrase "arising in the course of employment" to include two
categories: (1) "injuries sustained in furtherance of the business or
affairs of the employer," and (2) "certain other injuries" that occur
on property that the employer occupies, controls, or "upon which
the employer's business affairs are conducted."50 Regarding this
second category, the Workers' Compensation Act requires "that the
nature of the employment requires the employee's presence on the
premises where the injury occurred."51 On its face, Hoffman's claim
did not appear to fit either category, because when she stopped by
her workplace solely for the purpose of picking up her paycheck,
she was not furthering her employer's business, and Hoffman was
not required to be physically present at the workplace in order to
be paid. 52
However, Justice Saylor cited several Pennsylvania Superior
Court opinions that have "acknowledged the receipt of wages as a
fundamental aspect of the employment relationship" in support of
the Hoffman court's decision to award benefits.- According to the
Hoffman court, the fact that Hoffman was not required to be
present at the workplace in order to be paid does not bar her
claim; the court stated its holding as follows:
[Riegardless of other available options, an employee's presence
at the workplace to obtain a paycheck pursuant to an
employer-approved practice bears a sufficient relationship to a
necessary affair of the employer (payment of due wages) to
fall within the course of employment as defined in . . . the
[Workers' Compensation] Act.M
The court did not expressly tie its holding to one of the two
categories of "arising within the course of employment" discussed
49. Id. at 1287 (citing Paulin v. Williams & Co., 195 A. 40, 42 (Pa. 1937)).
50. Id.; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (West Supp. 2000).
51. Hoffman, 741 A.2d at 1287 & n.3 (emphasis added); see PA- STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411
(West Supp. 2000).
52. Hoffman, 741 A.2d at 1287-88.
53. Id. at 1288 (citing Dandy v. Glaze, 177 A.2d 157, 159 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962); Griffin v.
Acme Coal Co., 54 A.2d 69, 70 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1947)).
54. Id.
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above.5
This decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court brings
Pennsylvania in line with the relevant workers' compensation law
56
of Oklahoma, Michigan, and New Mexico.
EMPLOYMENT LAw -

WORKERS' COMPENSATION -

EMPLOYER'S PETITION

To TERMINATE BENEFITS - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that an employer attempting to terminate worker's compensation
benefits does not have the burden of proving the absence of a
causal relationship between the work-related injury and a
subsequently alleged psychiatric injury when the employer only
accepted liability for the physical injuries suffered by the claimant;
the employer need only prove that the physical injuries have
ceased.
Commercial Credit Claims v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Board (Lancaster), 728 A.2d 902 (Pa. 1999).
On July 28, 1983, John Lancaster plunged nearly twenty-eight feet
from a catwalk while taking photographs for his job as a claims
adjuster.57 Lancaster's employer, Commercial Credit Claims
("Commercial"), and its insurance carrier subsequently issued a
notice of compensation payable5 and accepted liability for
Lancaster's physical injuries. 59 Three years later, Commercial filed a
petition to terminate Lancaster's benefits, "alleging that as of April
28, 1986, claimant had fully recovered from the work-related
injury."6° Lancaster later testified that he continued to experience
pain.6' Conversely, a board-certified neurologist for Commercial
opined that the initial injuries could not have caused the current
pain; instead, he believed that Lancaster's main problem was
62
psychological in nature, not physical.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing St. Anthony Hosp. v. James, 889 P.2d 1279 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994); Dunlap
v. Clinton Valley Center, 425 N.W.2d 553 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); and Martinez v. Stoller, 632
P.2d 1209 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981)).
57. See Commercial Credit Claims v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Lancaster),
728 A.2d 902, 903 (Pa. 1999).
58. The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act provides that the employer shall
commence the payment of compensation due either pursuant to an agreement upon the
compensation payable or a notice of compensation payable." PA STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 717.1(a)
(West Supp. 2000).
59. See Commercial Credit Claims, 728 A.2d at 903. Commercial described Lancaster's
physical injuries as "cervical syndrome, sprain[ed] right sternoclavicular joint." See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
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The worker's compensation judge ("WCJ") found that the
neurologist never "rule[d] out the nexus between the claimant's
work injury and the disabling [psychological] condition."6 Because
the neurologist raised the possibility that Lancaster's psychological
problem could have stemmed from the work injury, the WCJ
denied Commercial's termination petition.6 Subsequently, both the
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board and the Pennsylvania
65
Commonwealth Court affirmed.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Commercial's petition
for appeal in order to determine whether an employer attempting
to terminate worker's compensation benefits must disprove a
causal relationship between the work-related injury and a
subsequently alleged psychiatric injury when the employer only
accepted liability for the physical injuries suffered by the
66
claimant.
The court reversed the commonwealth court and granted
Commercial's petition to terminate benefits.6 7 Writing for the court,
Justice Ronald D. Castille began by examining the relevant sections
of the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act ("Act"). 68 First, the
court stated that Commercial complied with the Act when it
commenced payment of compensation "pursuant to ... a notice of
compensation." 9 Next, the court found that the notice of
compensation, which defined the terms for payment and described
the injury, was "valid and binding unless modified or set aside" as
provided for in the Act.70 Finally, after reviewing the modification
procedures set forth in the Act, Justice Castille stated that either
party may file a petition to modify the original notice of
compensation payable; the moving party must then prove the
63. See id.
64. See Commercial Credit Claims, 728 A.2d at 903.
65.

See id.

66. Id. At the supreme court, attorneys Fred C. Trenor and Miles D. Kirshner from
Pittsburgh represented Commercial, and attorney Anthony Kovach from Uniontown
represented Lancaster. See id. at 902. Justice Ronald D. Castille wrote the opinion for the
majority, which included Chief Justice John P. Flaherty, Jr., and Justices Stephen A. Zappala,
Sandra Schultz Newman, and Thomas G. Saylor. Id. at 902-06. Justice Ralph J. Cappy
concurred in the result only. Id. at 906. Justice Russell M. Nigro filed a separate opinion,
concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 906-07 (Nigro, J., concurring and dissenting).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Commercial Credit Claims, 728 A.2d at 904. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 711.1(a)
(West Supp. 2000).
70. Commercial Credit Claims, 728 A.2d at 904. See PA_ STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 731 (West
1992).
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grounds for modification. 71 Thus, the court found that Lancaster's
"subsequently alleged psychiatric injuries could have formed the
predicate for compensation under the Act only if the Notice of
Compensation Payable was first properly modified . . . to reflect
72
the employer's increased liability for these distinct injuries."
Relying on the Act to reach its conclusion, the court held that
Commercial needed only to prove that Lancaster's physical injuries
had ceased; therefore, Commercial had no burden to disprove a
causal relationship between the work injury and the subsequently
alleged psychological injury. 73 Because Lancaster never attempted
to modify the terms of the original notice of compensation payable,
the court stated that the proper inquiry is whether the injuries
initially described by
Commercial
had been resolved. 74
Consequently, the court granted Commercial's petition to terminate
benefits because the expert testimony of the neurologist
75
established that the original physical injuries had been resolved.
In addition to the statutory language, the court relied on the
underlying goals of the Act in reaching its conclusion.76 Based on
the principle of fairness, the court concluded that it would "impose
a burden on an employer to 'prove a negative' by establishing that
the subsequently alleged psychiatric injury bore no causal
relationship to the work-related accident."7 7 The majority contended
that allowing employees to continue to receive benefits until the
employer disproves a causal relationship would "strain the
humanitarian goals underlying the [Act]."78 The court reversed the
order of the commonwealth court. 79
71. See Commercial Credit Claims, 728 A.2d at 905. The Act provides that a notice of
compensation payable may be modified or set aside "upon petition filed by either party... if
it be proved that such notice of compensation payable . . . was in any material respect
incorrect." Title 77, § 771 (West Supp. 2000). The Act also provides that a workers'
compensation judge may "modify, reinstate, suspend, or terminate a notice of compensation
payable . . . upon petition fied by either party . . . upon proof that the disability of an
injured employe has increased, decreased, recurred, or has temporarily or finally ceased."
Title 77, § 772 (West Supp. 2000).
72. Commercial Credit Claims, 728 A.2d at 905.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 905, 906.
76. Id. at 905. The court emphasized that "sound considerations of policy militate
heavily in favor of this conclusion." Id.
77. Commercial Credit Claims, 728 A.2d at 905.
78. Id. Justice Castille noted that notwithstanding the court's decision, Lancaster may
still file a petition for review to amend the original notice of compensation payable by
proving that the psychiatric injury resulted from the original work-related injury. Id.
79. Id. at 906.

2000

Pennsylvania Employment Law

Concurring in part, Justice Russell M. Nigro agreed with the
majority that Commercial did not have to disprove the causal
relationship between the work-related injury and the subsequent
psychiatric injury.80 Regarding the majority's decision to terminate
benefits, however, Justice Nigro disagreed81 In dissent, Justice
Nigro stated that, to terminate benefits, an "employer must
establish that all disability related to a compensable injury has
ceased." 2 Justice Nigro determined that Commercial did not meet
this burden based on the testimony of the neurologist., The
dissent, therefore, would have remanded the case to determine
whether Lancaster's initial injuries had, in fact, ceased.84
EMPLOYMENT
INJURIES -

employer

LAW -

WORKERS'

COMPENSATION

-

SELF

INFLICTED

The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that an

met

its

burden

of

proof

for

its

suspension

of

compensation benefits by proving that the employee voluntarily
removed himself from the work-force by self-inflicting a gunshot
wound to the head, and that the employee was not able to raise the
argument that an earlier work-related back injury caused the
mental imbalance that provoked the self-inflicted injury because the
employee did not properly preserve this issue for appeal.
Curtis v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Berley Electric
Company), 730 A.2d 528 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
Around 1:30 a.m. on December 19, 1998, Keith Curtis loaded his
85
gun with one bullet, spun the chamber, and aimed it at his head.
86
The first time Curtis pulled the trigger, the gun did not discharge.
Pulling the trigger a second time, however, Curtis shot himself in
87
the head, inflicting an injury that left him in a vegetative state.
Almost two years before this incident, Curtis had injured his
80. Id. (Nigro, J., concurring and dissenting).
81. Id. (Nigro, J., concurring and dissenting).
82. Commercial Credit Claims, 728 A.2d at 906 (Nigro, J., concurring and dissenting)
(citing Pieper v. Ametek-Thermox Instruments Div., 584 A.2d 301 (Pa. 1990)).
83. Id. at 906, 907 (Nigro, J., concurring and dissenting).
84. Id. at 907 (Nigro, J., concurring and dissenting).
85. See Curtis v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Bd. (Berley Electric Co.), 730 A.2d 528,
531 (Pa. Comnw. Ct. 1999). The shot to the head followed an afternoon and evening during
which Curtis drank a case of beer, snorted cocaine, and argued with his girlfriend, Vicki
Beaky, because Curtis had not yet packed for an upcoming trip to Las Vegas. See id. at 530.
After this argument, Curtis went into the bedroom with a gun, and Beaky heard Curtis empty
the bullets. See id. Curtis then reentered the room where Beaky was, and placed one bullet
in the gun's chamber. See id.
86. See Curtis, 730 A.2d at 531.
87. See id. Curtis is "unlikely to ever recover." See id.
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lower back while working at Berley Electric Company ("Berley")
and began receiving total workers' compensation benefits under the
Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act ("Act"). 8 Several months
after this initial work-related injury, Curtis encountered increased
pain in his back and right leg.8 9 A second MRI found a recurrent
disc herniation; the treating physician recommended a procedure
that involved excising the disc and possible fusion. 90
In addition to the medical treatment, another physician was
treating Curtis for psychological problems that stemmed from
alcoholism abuse, drug addiction, and marital difficulties, all of
which surfaced before his work-related injury.91 In spite of this
treatment, Curtis continued abusing drugs and alcohol, which
necessitated three hospital visits within four days, less than one
month before he shot himself.92 During the first two hospital visits,
Curtis refused medical treatment and signed himself out of the
hospital against medical advice.9 3 On the third hospital visit, an
emergency room physician signed an application to have Curtis
involuntarily committed under Pennsylvania statute for a
psychiatric evaluation. 94 Less than one month later, Curtis shot
95
himself.
Berley then filed a petition to suspend Curtis' workers'
compensation benefits for the work-related back injury, alleging
that the disc excision and fusion surgery that Curtis never received
would have brought about a partial or complete recovery of Curtis'
back injury and allowed his return to work. 96 Additionally, Berley
alleged that by refusing medical treatment and by intentionally
shooting himself in the head, Curtis voluntarily withdrew from the
work force, thereby removing himself from coverage under the
88. See id. at 530. Medical tests revealed a herniated disk on Curtis' right side. See id.
89. See id. at 530.
90. See id.
91. See Curtis, 730 A.2d at 530. The family doctor had prescribed various medications
for tremors and other symptoms associated with alcohol withdrawal. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. The statute referred to is the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act,
PA STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7101-7503 (West 1998). For an argument that Pennsylvania courts
inconsistently interpret the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act, and a suggested
interpretation, see Steven B. Datlof, The Law of Civil Commitment in Pennsylvania:
Towards a Consistent Interpretationof the Mental Health Procedures Act, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 1
(1999).
95. See Curtis, 730 A.2d at 531.
96. See id. at 531.
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Act.97
Initially, the workers' compensation judge ("WCJ") denied
Berley's petitions and ordered that Curtis continue to receive his
benefits. 98 Subsequently, Berley appealed to the Workers'
Compensation Appeal Board ("Board"), which remanded the case
for additional fact finding.99 On remand, the WCJ concluded
(1) that the disc excision and fusion procedure available to Curtis
was reasonable and (2) that a review of all the circumstances
indicated that Curtis did not want to reduce his disability and
return to work, but instead, wanted to end his life.'0 Further, the
WCJ held that Berley satisfied its burden of showing that Curtis
refused reasonable medical treatment. 10 After the WCJ granied
Berley's petition to suspend workers' compensation benefits, Curtis
02
appealed to the Board; the Board affirmed the decision below.'
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court considered
whether "the WCJ erred by concluding [that Curtis] intentionally
inflicted injury to himself and thereby voluntarily removed himself
from the work force," consequently forfeiting his rights to future
compensation. 01 3 Authoring the court's opinion, Judge James
Flaherty rejected Curtis' argument that the self-inflicted injury was
compensable because it was causally related to his preexisting
work injury. °4 Curtis maintained that the WCJ erred by failing to
apply the "chain-of-causation test" before determining that his
self-inflicted injury forfeited his right to continued compensation
under the Act for his initial work-related back injury.105
97. See id.
98. See id. at 531.
99. See id.
100. See Curtis, 730 A.2d at 532.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 532. Curtis also raised the issue of whether the WCJ erred by concluding
that [Curtis] refused reasonable medical treatment;" however, because the court affirmed the
WCJ on the first issue, '[it] [was] not necessary to address [Curtis'] second issue." Id. at 532,
536.
At the conmnonwealth court, attorney George D. Walker, Jr., from the Philadelphia law
firm of Larry Pitt & Associates represented Curtis, and attorney Martin J. Fallon, Jr., from
the Philadelphia law firm of Swartz Campbell & Detweller represented Berley. See id. at 529.
Judge James J. Flaherty wrote the opinion for a unanimous panel of the court, which
included Judge Dante R. Pelligrini and Senior Judge Mirarchi, Jr. See id. at 529-36.
104. Id. at 532-33, 536.
105. See Curtis, 730 A.2d at 532. The court explained the chain-of-causation test as
follows:
The three elements of the chain-of-causation test which render an otherwise
non-compensable self-inflicted injury compensable under the [Pennsylvania Workers'
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Judge Flaherty explained that the chain-of-causation test, which
is used to establish whether a "self-inflicted injury occurred during
an episode for which the employee was not legally responsible,"
placed a burden "upon [Curtis] to prove that a self-inflicted injury
which is otherwise not compensable under [the Pennsylvania
Workers' Compensation Act], [became] compensable because it was
causally related to a pre-existing work-related injury."106 Because
the Act specifically prohibits compensation for intentionally
inflicted injuries, in such cases the employer has the initial burden
"to prove that the injury was intentionally self-inflicted." 1 7 Once the
employer meets that burden, the burden of proof then shifts to the
claimant to prove, under the chain-of-causation test, that a
pre-existing work-related injury disturbed the claimant's mental
processes to the point that a self-inflicted injury or suicide
resulted.108 Before this burden shift, however, the court
demonstrated that the requirements placed upon the employer
seeking to suspend, terminate, or modify benefits are satisfied
when the employer proves that the employee has voluntarily
removed himself from the labor market. 10 9
Agreeing with Curtis that the chain-of-causation test should
typically be applied in such a case, the court, nonetheless, disposed
of Curtis' argument because Curtis did not raise an argument about
the work-related nature of his injury in the initial litigation;
therefore, this issue was not preserved for appeal.110 Thus, the
Compensation Act] are:
1) the Claimant initially suffered a work-related injury as defined by [the Act];
2) the initial work-related injury caused the Claimant to become dominated by a
disturbance of the mind of such severity as to override normal rational judgment; and
3) this mental disturbance resulted in the self-inflicted inury or suicide.
Id. at 533 n.8 (citing Globe Security Systems Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
(McCoy Catering Services), 518 A.2d 883 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986)). The court stressed that
"the use of the word awarded substantially differentiates the facts and issues in the case sub
judice, since the critical issue in the case before us is not the awarding of benefits, but is
instead, the suspension of benefits." Id. at 532 n.8 (emphasis added). Although this was the
first time that the chain-of-causation test had been raised regarding the suspension of
benefits, the court concluded that it should be applied when determining the suspension of
benefits, as well as when determining the award of benefits, because of a self-inflicted injury.
Id. at 533.
106. Id. at 533.
107. Id. at 533 n.9 & n.10 (stating that "[w]ithout anything further, once the Employer
proves that the injury was intentionally self-inflicted, benefits under the Act must be
denied"). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431 (stating that "no compensation shall be paid when
the injury or death is intentionally self-inflicted").
108. Id. at 533 n.10.
109. Id. at 534.
110. Curtis, 730 A.2d at 533-34.
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court limited its review to the issue of whether Berley properly
suspended the compensation benefits."' The court concluded that
Berley met its burden of proving that Curtis voluntarily removed
himself from the work force by providing evidence that Curtis put
a loaded gun to his own head and-pulled the trigger."2 The court
emphasized that because Curtis never contended that his
work-related injuries caused him to shoot himself, Curtis waived
the issue." 3 Further, the court accepted the WCJ findings that
Curtis shot himself as a result of problems with his marriage, his
girlfriend, and alcohol.'
Judge Flaherty, writing for the court,
affirmed the WCJ and the Board's decisions and found that Curtis
forfeited his right to future compensation when he pulled that
15
trigger.
EMPLOYMENT LAw WORKERS' COMPENSATION ExCLusIVIrY OF
RELIEF - The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that an employee's

defamation and malicious abuse of process claims against an
employer are not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the
Workers' Compensation Act because the essence of those torts is
to vindicate harm to one's reputation, which is not an injury under
the Act.
Urban v. Dollar Bank, 725 A.2d 815 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), appeal
granted, 742 A.2d 172 (Pa. Aug. 6, 1999).
While packing her suitcases for a three-week Florida vacation
from her job as the lead teller in a suburban branch of Dollar
Bank, a surprised Lynn Urban was interrupted by police officers
executing an application to have her involuntarily committed." 6 The
involuntary commitment application was filed by one of Urban's
co-workers, based on a report known to Dollar Bank personnel to
be false that Urban said she "would have no problem bringing a
7
gun in here and killing someone.""
111. Id. at 535.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at at 535.
115. Curtis, 730 A2d 536.
116. See Urban v. Dollar Bank, 725 A.2d 815, 817 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), appeal granted,
742 A-2d 172 (Pa. Aug. 6, 1999).
117. Urban, 725 A.2d at 817. The involuntary commitment application was filed under
the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7101-7503 (West
1998). For an argument that Pennsylvania courts inconsistently interpret the Pennsylvania
Mental Health Procedures Act, and a suggested interpretation, see Steven B. Datlof, The Law
of Civil Commitment in Pennsylvania: Towards a- Consistent Interpretation of the Mental
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Urban was shocked to learn that Dollar Bank had instituted an
involuntary commitment against her, and because she was "calm
and cooperative," the police called Dollar Bank to verify that it still
wanted to go through with the involuntary commitment.118 After
receiving such verification, Urban was "strapped to a gurney by
paramedics and taken to St. Clair Memorial Hospital." 19 Urban was
detained at the hospital for several hours, until a fifteen minute
interview with a staff psychiatrist made it clear that she was not
suffering from any "severe mental disability" sufficient to support
the involuntary commitment. 20 Subsequent litigation produced
evidence tending to show that Dollar Bank used the involuntary
12
commitment to build a record to justify later firing Urban. 1
A few months after the incident, Urban filed a complaint against
Dollar Bank for, among other things, defamation and malicious
abuse of process. 122 Urban sought damages for injury to her
emotional being, injury to her reputation, and dimunition of her
23
earning capacity and her, "ability to enjoy the pleasures of life."
Dollar Bank moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act ("Act") barred Urban's
claim because the Act is the exclusive remedy for Pennsylvania
employees who suffer on-the-job injuries or deaths. 24 The trial
court granted Dollar Bank's motion, and Urban appealed to the
Pennsylvania Superior Court.125

In a well-crafted opinion by Judge Kate Ford Elliott, the superior
court reversed the trial court and held that the Pennsylvania
Workers' Compensation Act does not bar an employee's claims of
defamation and malicious abuse of process. 12 6 Judge Ford Elliot's
Health ProceduresAct, 38 DUQ. L REV. 1 (1999).
118, See Urban, 725 A.2d at 817.
119.

See id.

120. See id.; Urban v. Dollar Bank, 34 Pa. D. & C.4th 11, 12 (Comm. Pleas Allegheny
Co. 1996).
121. See Urban, 725 A.2d at 817.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 817-18; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481(a) (West 1992) (setting forth the
exclusive nature of the Act).
125. See Urban, 725 A.2d at 817. At the superior court, attorney Patrick J. Loughren
from the Pittsburgh law firm of Loughren, Loughren & Loughren represented Urban, and
attorney Lori D. Mendicino from the Pittsburgh law firm of Robb, Leonard & Mulvihill
represented Dollar Bank. See id. at 816.
Judge Kate Ford Elliott wrote the opinion for a unanimous panel, which included Judge J.
Michael Eakin and Judge Beck. See id. at 816-22.
126. Id. at 816. The superior court affirmed the trial court's decision that the Act bars
claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional
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analysis of the legal issue began by explaining that "[t]he Act
provides the exclusive remedy for employees who are 'entitled to
damages in any action at law or otherwise on account of any injury
or death' as defined in [sections 411(1) and 411(2)]."27 The Act
does not provide a definition of the term "injury;" Pennsylvania
appellate courts have interpreted "injury" as it is used in the Act to
include "physical impairment, occupational disease, and mental
illness or psychiatric injury." 128 Judge Ford Elliot relied on a
dissenting opinion in Hammerstein v. Lindsay,"1 9 a 1995 decision
of the superior court, for the proposition that under the Act,
injured workers are entitled to a remedy only "for partial or total
'disability,' i.e., diminution in earning power, and for medical
services." 130
The Urban court then found that the essence of the tort of
defamation is to provide compensation for an injury to one's
reputation, not to compensate one for a physical or emotional
impairment that requires medical treatment.1 31 The court rejected
Dollar Bank's argument that the Act bars a civil suit for defamation
because the Act bars all suits based on intentional torts committed
by employers.' 32 Distinguishing a superior court precedent that
"affirn[ed] the dismissal of claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and intentional interference with contractual
relationship," the court held that injury to one's reputation is too
"attenuated from any injury contemplated by the Act" for the Act to
distress. Id. at 822. Judge Ford Elliot was joined in her opinion by Judges Eakin and Beck.
Id. at 816.
127. Id. at 818 (footnote omitted) (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481(a) (West 1992)).
128. Id. at 819 (citing Hammerstein v. Lindsay, 655 A.2d 597 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)
(Wieand, J., dissenting) (citing Martin v. Ketchum, Inc., 568 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1990); Al's Radiator
Service v. WCAB (Jorden's Radiator Service), 630 A.2d 485 (Pa Commw. Ct. 1993); and
Archer v. WCAB (General Motors), 587 A.2d 901 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991))).
129. 655 A.2d 597 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
130. Urban, 725 A.2d at 819 (citing Hammerstein, 655 A.2d at 605 (Wieand, J.,
dissenting)).
131. Id. (quoting Hammerstein, 655 A.2d at 605-06 (Wieand, J., dissenting)). In a
footnote, the Urban court provided the following definition of the tort of defamation in
Pennsylvania:
A statement is defamatory if it (1) so harms the reputation of the complaining party
so as to lower her in the estimation of the community, (2) deters third parties from
associating or dealing with her, (3) exposes her to public hatred, contempt, or
ridicule, or (4) adversely affects her fitness for the proper conduct of her lawful
business or profession.
Id. at 819 n.5 (emphasis added) (citing Green v. Mizner, 692 A.2d 169, 172 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1997)).
132. Id. at 819-20.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 38:851

bar a civil suit for defamation.'1
Similarly, Judge Ford Elliot found that the tort of malicious
abuse of process "is designed to vindicate, inter alia, harm to one's
reputation and financial injury sustained as a result of the tort."'1
Therefore, the Urban court found "that this claim is also not wholly
barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act."1 35 Finally, the
superior court clarified that Urban would not be able to recover for
emotional injuries resulting from her employer's defamatory
conduct and malicious abuse of process, because injury to one's
emotional being is covered by the Act; however, Urban "is free to
seek compensation at common law for the other elements of
damage arising from the [two torts].1 36
This significant case, which allows Pennsylvania employees a
limited ability to sue their employers outside the Pennsylvania
Workers' Compensation Act for at least two intentional torts,
defamation and malicious abuse of process, will soon be heard by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 137

133. Id. at 820 (discussing Shaffer v. Procter & Gamble, 604 A.2d 289 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) and Martin v. Lancaster Battery Co., 606 A.2d 444 (Pa. 1992)).
134. Id. at 821. The court quoted the relevant Pennsylvania statute that "specifically
enumerate[s] six classes of compensable damages for [malicious abuse of process]":
(1) The harm normally resulting from any arrest or imprisonment, or any
dispossession or interference with the advantageous use of his land, chattels or other
things, suffered by him during the course of the proceedings.
(2) The harm to his reputation by any defamatory matter alleged as the basis of the
proceedings.
(3) The expense, including any reasonable attorney fees, that he has reasonably
incurred in defending himself against the proceedings.
(4) Any specific pecuniary loss that has resulted from the proceedings.
(5) Any emotional distress that is caused by the proceedings.
(6) Punitive damages according to law in appropriate cases.
Id. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8353 (1998).
135. Urban, 725 A.2d at 821.
136. Id. at 822.
137. Urban v. Dollar Bank, 742 A.2d 172 (Pa. Aug. 6, 1999) (granting appeal).

